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Sub-Saharan African Debt: Notes
1. Data on SSA external debt are weak. In most cases they are from somewhat
to grossly incomplete. The pre-crisis estimate for Nigeria was about
$8,000 million; the present one is over $20,000 million. For Tanzania 
initial international estimates for 31-XII-83 were about $2,000 million. 
Detailed data collection by the Central Bank and two external cooperating 
banks produced an end 1984 estimate of the order of $4,500 million.
2. There are four main reasons for the undercount:
a. incomplete recording by SSA countries and/or failure to keep 
corrections for currency valuation changes up to date;
b. World Bank coverage which does not include arrears of interest nor 
trade credit arrears;
c. general difficulty of estimating short term commercial credit 
accurately except when it is in arrear leading to a sudden explosive 
rise as and when regular payment is interrupted;
d. the historic fact (as demonstrated in Latin America in 1981-84) that 
pre-crisis external debt estimates tend to be at least 20Í under the 
total a more detailed, crisis context calculation reveals.
3. Main types of External Debt:
A. Short (up to 1 year initial duration or no stated duration)
1. Non Bank Foreign Enterprise
a. unconfirmed letters of credit
b. trade bills
c. non-financial firm quasi-supplier credits
d. open book credit (e.g. ÜAC or Fiat to UAC-Ghana or 
Fiat-Tanzania)
e. arrears thereon
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• These are normally to enterprises in SSA. They are rarely 
estimated until they go into arrear but in normal pre-1980 trade 
context often were up to 3 months total imports revolving on 
average twice a year.
ii. Commercial Bank Short
a. confirmed letters of credit (confirmed by domestic bank or 
more generally external bank CLC)
b. revolving trade or (to Central Bank) swing credit
c. lines of credit (usually to banks, e.g. Barclays-Botswana or 
to Central Banks)
d. arrears thereon
iii. Government (foreign)
Defaulted guaranteed trade credit (unless defaulted it appears or 
should appear in categories i and ii depending on type of 
enterprise initially extending it. When defaulted it is paid to 
issuer by export credit agency and becomes a bilateral government 
to government claim which can be/is included in Paris Club 
negotiations/reschedulings).
iv. Arrears of Principle/Interest on Medium/Long term debt. As the 
arrears do not arise until after payment is due they are short 
term even though they relate to long or medium term debt.
v. Contract or Invisible Payment Arrears
These may be in local currency but remittable when received by 
the enterprise, e.g. a foreign contractor or airline. Thus the 
payment (whether initially in foreign or local currency) will 
give rise to a foreign currency obligation.
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B. Medium And Long (Over 1 year initial duration - in fact 1 to 3 year 
items are more like short)
i. Non Bank Private
a. intra group loans
b. capital goods supplier credits (of over 1 year) 
ii. Commercial Bank
a. project loans - general credit of enterprise/country
b. project loans - secured on project export earnings stream
c. general purpose
iii. Non Concessional Government/International Financial Institutions
a. guaranteed export credits (normally ii-a until defaulted,
i.e., project loan advanced by bank with guarantee and 
interest subsidy by official export credit agency)
b. World Bank (bank window and IFC), ADB (bank window), BADEA 
(normal terms), CDC
c. International Monetary Fund (except Trust Fund, Structural 
Adjustment Facility)
iv. Concessional Official
a. some export credit (e.g. Italian 2g$, 5 + 1 5  year export
credit to certain least developed countries)
b. bilateral government to government (e.g. USAID loans)
c. International Development Association (IDA of World Bank) 
ADF, IFAD, etc.
d. IMF (Trust Fund, SAF)
Note: arrears on medium and long are short term because by
definition they are overdue and therefore have an "initial 
duration" before scheduled payment of 0 days, let alone 
years.
Certain of these categories require special comment beginning with short 
term trade credit. This credit is hard to quantify when turning over 
normally (albeit recording of nature of payment associated with orders 
under import licenses and/or of goods received at customs could build up 
much better estimates than normally exist). When arrears begin they are 
likely to snowball:
a. for up to 365 days bills for imports which arrived earlier will fall 
due (exceeding current imports if market or allocation policies have 
cut these);
b. at the same time arrears will cause an increasing number of suppliers 
to demand cash or letters of credit confirmed by external 
international banks who in turn will move toward demanding 100% cash 
cover before confirming;
c. thus raising payments due well above current import levels and 
causing arrears to rise until the point is reached at which all 
commercial imports are for cash down with no trade credit left 
(except for the "frozen" arrears which by then act as a blockage 
against securing any new trade credit).
This form of forced external borrowing (i.e. trade arrears) is very 
expensive. The fact that interest may not be paid (usually is not) does 
not detract from that.
a. with the loss of commercial credit more forex is needed to pay for 
imports in advance;
b. therefore, it is much harder to avoid fitting import levels to export 
swings (seasonally and in respect to shortfalls) as there is no 
credit left to buffer or even-out even normal seasonal swings in 
external cash flow;
c. with dead assets (arrears) and doubts as to payment on new shipments 
suppliers will (not unreasonably from their point of view) raise 
prices. 20 to 30$ on particular goods and 10 to 15$ on total 
commercial import bill is probably not uncommon for states with very
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large arrears, e.g. Zambia, Tanzania. That cost alone can be 20 to 
30Í of export earnings;
d. clearing up arrears of trade credit (except officially guaranteed 
items) has to date proven nearly impossible when they had become 
really large, e.g. in the cases of Zambia and Tanzania they equal or 
exceed one year's exports. Assuming 6% interest, 2 years grace, 6 
years repayment (generous from the point of view of the creditors) 
servicing them in the 3rd year (first repayment) would cost over 22% 
of exports.
Contract and invisible arrears (3 - A - v) are broadly analogous to 
trade credits in these respects.
6. IMF drawings at 7 to 8% interest, 3 years grace and 3 years repayment are 
quite unsuitable as a basic source of external finance for structural 
adjustment programmes. Recovery of external balance even in the sense 
that exports plus grants and concessional loans equal requisite imports 
plus interest plus repayments on concessional loans cannot reasonably be 
expected for the most severely affected SSA economies until 7 to 10 years 
after structural adjustment starts. Net repayment of large IMF drawings 
in years 4 through 7 is simply not compatible with structural adjustment 
with growth.
7. In practice IMF drawings can, in a sense, be rolled-over through back to 
back standbys so from year 4 on new drawings are made to finance 
repurchases of earlier ones. Given the interest rates, this is expensive 
financially and given the time to negotiate and the limitations imposed 
by higher credit tranche standbys it is likely to have high scarce 
personnel and not inconsiderable policy costs. Further, it is risky - in 
SSA few IMF agreements (let alone series' of agreements) have worked
smoothly without delays in, or suspension of, drawings. The risk of
forced default (because the new drawing has not been achieved) is ever 
present.
8. The Structural Adjustment Facility is at one level more suitable for SA 
use. interest, 6 years grace and 4 to repay begins to fit a possible
external balance recovery time frame and is certainly concessional.
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However, unless the present finance is raised (President Conable and 
Managing Director Camdessus have proposed trebling) there are very 
limited resources. Further, to date the Fund has in fact, at least 
sometimes, applied stricter, shorter term performance targets to SAF 
credits than to standby drawings. This appears inconsistent as the 
purpose of SAF is presumably to allow a longer period before repayment to 
make practicable a more gradual structural adjustment.
9. Devaluation, rescheduling, external debt service and domestic budget 
deficits (recurrent) and financing requirements (development or capital 
budget plus/minus recurrent deficit/surplus have complex inter-actions:
a. devaluation does not affect the real resource cost of external debt 
service. External debt is usually (in SSA always except for a few 
intra SSA debts) denominated in the lender’s currency. Thus 
devaluation does not affect the forex cost (e.g. amount of exports, $ 
or £ or Yen or DM amount of foreign ’aid’) needed to service external 
debt;
b. devaluation does raise the domestic cost of external debt service. 
The constant forex obligation costs more units of local currency;
c. thus there may be a fiscal problem. Domestic revenue is unlikely to
rise as rapidly as the price of foreign exchange unless domestic 
inflation wipes out the nominal devaluation (and undesirable result) 
- so devaluation, through higher local currency cost of constant
forex obligations ijs likely to widen domestic deficit/financing 
requirements;
d. rescheduling reduces forex obligations during the grace period (i.e. 
it rolls them forward). Whether it reduces actual outflow depends on 
how much was being paid (as opposed to falling due) before 
rescheduling;
e. rescheduling - without an IMF agreement - may reduce the local
currency budgetary cost of external debt service. It does so if the
external payments paid times the new exchange rate exceed the
external debt service payment made abroad or into a blocked arrears
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account with the Central Bank times the old exchange rate before 
rescheduling. (It is assumed that Paris Club rescheduling usually is 
part of a set of measures including devaluation.);
f. rescheduling - with an IMF agreement may sharply increase the local
currency cost of external debt service. This occurs if the IMF
agreement provides that payments by the government will be on the old 
schedule and that until paid abroad on the new schedule the Central 
Bank will hold them in a blocked account;
g. The real resource cost of transfers to a blocked account is nil. The 
implications in respect to performance ("trigger”) clauses can be 
major. If the blocked account does not count as a Treasury deposit 
to offset against borrowing from the Central Bank then such transfers 
count as part of the government bank borrowing ceiling;
h. the result of f/g is that for any given real level of domestic
spending more revenue must be raised to avoid breaking a debt ceiling 
and that the blocked amount is sterilised (i.e. it is an increase in 
money supply which is not allowed to feed through to domestic credit 
formation and, therefore, demand for/upward pressure on prices of
domestic goods and services).
10. For SSA economies the bottom line is:
(G + L) - (I + A + AR) = NRI (NRO)
G = Grants
L = New Loans
I = Interest
A = Amortisation (Principal Repayment)
AR = Arrears Reduction
NRI = Net Resource Inflow (if G + L is larger)
NRO = Net Resource Outflow (I + A + AR is larger)
a. For virtually all SSA economies it is essential to have - and to seek 
to maximise - GRI. (Strong external balance and/or reserve economies 
like Botswana can afford short run low GRI’s or even passing small 
GRO’s. Others cannot.)
b. However, two ways of raising GRI are as noted earlier - unsound:
i. AA, i.e. Arrears Accumulation which leads to an overhang of 
short term obligations, higher import costs and reduction of G 
+ L;
ii. fully commercial L unless for projects which will not only be 
profitable but also will generate a foreign exchange flow from 
exports at levels and with a time profile adequate to pay the 
interest and amortisation on that loan;
c. It is necessary to include G because otherwise the true external
balance position and the overall NRI cannot be known:
(G + L) + X + AA = (I + A + AR) + M — Reserves Change.
( G + L )  - ( I + A + A R )  + AA — Reserves Change = X - M.
There are potential implications from the above:
a. the Latin American external debt model may not be appropriate as in 
the large LA states G is negligible;
b. similarly for these states L costs are more uniform because 
concessionary loans are negligible too;
c. therefore it is crucial to maximise grants and concessional loans in 
SSA (whereas in LA this is often either a trivial or an impossible 
goal);
d. substituting grants or soft loans for hard loans increases net inflow 
(including G) but can reduce gross Loan inflow (excluding G). The 
bottom line matters, not the components taken out of context, e.g. 
when the UK switched to grant terms for most SSA countries, L - (I + 
R) on UK official went negative but (L + G) - (I + R) rose. 
Similarly for the IBRD Bank Window LB - (I + R) has gone negative 
because the loans have been replaced by rising volumes of IDA credits 
so LB + LIDA - (I + R) has risen.
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e. The Alan Garcia (Peru) gross debt service (as a % of exports) ceiling 
may not be a good rule in SSA even though it probably is (would) be 
for most larger LA economies. That formula assumes G (grants) to be
nil or trivial; new loans at most equal to (rolling-over)
amortisation, and I (interest) if fully paid to exceed the ceiling % 
set.
f. In SSA G is not necessarily trivial and concessional. L can (and
often do exceed A (amortisation). Therefore a NRI (net resource
inflow) is attainable. If a ceiling % prejudices flows of G + 
concessional L it can lower the Net Resource Inflow, i.e. be 
counter-productive.
12. The OAU's internal debate on external debt has not always grasped clearly 
that NRI is the bottom line and that - unless one assumes G + 
concessional L are independent of unilateral 'deferral1 of payments - 
setting a % ceiling may not be consistent with maximising NRI. The 
warning that SSA debt is unmanageable, that no state can reduce its 
economy to a halt and its people to starvation and that there is a real 
danger of won't pay because can't pay situations is another matter. But 
its likely value is to push the laggard states (notably USA, Japan, 
Federal Germany and USSR) to accept movement in the directions proposed 
by the UK, France, Italy, the Nordic States and (except for its own 
claims) the World Bank:
a. longer periods to pay;
b. lower interest rates;
c. retrospective conversion of government to government loans to 
poor SSA countries into grants.
13* A checklist of what SSA states in severely strained external positions 
could usefully seek includes:
a. Paris Club rescheduling of arrears plus 5 to 10 years forward 
payments (e.g. arrears plus 19 8 7 / 8 8 - 1992/93 or 1997/98 payments) at 
one time;
b. no interest on rescheduled amounts during grace periods;
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c. 10 years grace (e.g. 1 9 8 7 / 8 8 and arrears would begin to be paid in 
1997/98);
d. 10 years repayment of rescheduled amounts (e.g. 1987/88 and arrears 
over 1997/98 - 2007/08);
e. interest during repayment at initial interest rate or 4$ a year 
whichever is less (a 50$ reduction on most export credits);
f. for present low income SSA countries retrospective conversion of past 
concessional loans (and optimally export credits in arrear) into 
grants;
g. for the same states conversion of past World Bank bank window loans 
into IDA credits.
14. Rather less sweeping rescheduling should be sought (can be won) by less 
debt embarrassed states. Any state whose debt service ratio exceeds 25
to 30$ is likely to have good reason to seek rescheduling and any with
over 50% is virtually certain to find it imperative. The proposals above 
break some new ground - 10 years future payments moved forward at one go 
is well beyond any current case and Bank to IDA conversions are unknown. 
However, the package is not miles beyond the recent Mozambique and Uganda 
Paris Club reschedulings - indeed it is less far from them than they are 
from the standard 1980/84 rescheduling format.
15. However, it must be remembered what rescheduling (including write-off) is 
about: raising NFI by reducing outflow consistent with raising inflows 
to meet minimum (or above) import targets consistent with economic 
rehabilitation, basic service restoration and growth. For countries with 
a Consultative Group/Roundtable this implies:
a. calculating operating, rehabilitation, new capacity import
requirements by sector on a consistent basis with stated assumptions;
b. subtracting projected exports less debt service (before
rescheduling);
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c. leaving gross new funds plus savings on rescheduling required;
d. negotiating with external financing sources a funding and 
rescheduling package meeting c, preferably on a disbursement 
schedule not merely a commitment basis;
e. implying that the Paris Club meeting once a CG/R agreement is reached 
should (as is not always now the case) act to implement the 
rescheduling savings the CG/R provided for in agreed projections, not
to carry out a parallel, free standing set of negotiations.
16. Regaining access to external credit should be a goal of SSA states. It
is not an unattainable one. The key questions relate to what credit for
what uses.
17. One key access recovery needed is for trade credit (from confirmed
letters of credit through open book credit) to reduce the levels of forex 
needed as working capital and to iron out seasonal imbalances. To pay 
cash forex in advance (literally or via 100% deposits to secure CLC’s) 
can raise forex requirements by up to 25$ of annual commercial imports 
(excluding externally financed projects, food aid and similar items).
That is not a burden a forex short SSA economy can afford to take
lightly. One sub-component in regaining such access (especially from 
exporters) is restoration of at least limited official export insurance 
on 90 and 180 day commercial trade billings.
18. To achieve this access requires:
a. an agreed rescheduling which reduces external debt service
obligations to levels which are credibly payable;
b. at least 6 months (perhaps up to 18 months) paying external
obligations on time (including not running up new commercial
arrears);
c. either clearing or rescheduling arrears on revolving trade credits 
with commercial banks;
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d. and on that record discussing with export credit agencies.
Nigeria, for example, has achieved partial restoration of short term 
commercial cover by ECGD within a year of reaching agreement with the 
World Bank and Fund even though it has not yet achieved a fully adequate 
set of arrangements for agreeing the amount or repayment schedule of 
non-guaranteed commercial arrears.
19. Export credit access for projects with high forex generating (or, in 
principle, saving as well) potential may also be important. Here as well 
as meeting the conditions set out for trade credit either a longer period 
of performance, a watertight prior claim on project export earnings or a 
case by case negotiation with official export credit agencies will be 
needed.
20. Access to non-trade voluntary commercial bank loans is (except for 
Botswana, Cameroon and perhaps 1 or 2 more) unlikely to be regainable 
before 2000. Perhaps luckily it is also undesirable - 8 to 10$ (or 
above), 3 to 7 year money is a luxury few SSA economies (and none engaged 
in SA programmes requiring Fund/Bank backing) can afford.
21. However, in the short term the access which can (and for survival of SA 
must) be maximised is that to grants, concessional loans (including SAF 
but not normal IMF drawings) and sweeping reschedulings.
- R. H. Green 
Falmer 
August 1987
